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AN INSIDE SCOOP ON SCOPES:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE LAWS AND POLICIES GOVERNING
THE SCOPES OF TRADE REMEDY ORDERS
By Scott D. McBride*
ABSTRACT
The globalization of supply and processing chains has led to an
increase in the complexity of international trade laws and the necessity for the
United States Department of Commerce to provide clarity in the enforcement
of trade remedy orders and procedures. It is therefore no surprise that over the
past few years, Commerce has experienced a surge in requests for rulings on
whether or not certain imported products are covered by the scope of
antidumping and countervailing duty orders. Furthermore, Commerce has
conducted several inquiries to determine if imported products which are
outside the scope of an antidumping or countervailing duty order are, in fact,
circumventing those orders through such means as third country processing
or minor alterations. These proceedings have brought to light how important
it is for domestic producers, injured by dumped or subsidized merchandise
and filing a petition for a trade remedy investigation, to propose definitions of
the scopes of their suggested orders that are clear, administrable, and prevent
the possibility of evasion. This paper on the “Inside Scoop on Scopes” is a
timely overview of the various laws and policies covering Commerce’s
definition of the scopes of its trade remedy orders, its subsequent
interpretation of those scopes, and its expansion of those scopes through
circumvention determinations, when necessary. Furthermore, it addresses
key holdings by the Court of International Trade and the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit with respect to these types of proceedings.
Scott D. McBride is an Assistant Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and
Compliance at the United States Department of Commerce, but the views expressed
in this paper are his alone, and not that of the government. Scott has over 19 years’
experience administering and litigating AD and CVD laws before United States
Federal Courts, North American Free Trade Agreement Panels, and the World Trade
Organization. Scope matters are one of Scott’s specialties and he would like to thank
Natalie Zink, Ian McInerney, and Saad Chalchal for their assistance in getting Scott’s
pen to paper. Most of all, Scott would like to thank his wife Jennifer, and children
Maegan, Nathaniel and Alana for their patience as Scott researched and drafted this
paper.
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INTRODUCTION

There is nothing more fundamental to antidumping (AD) and
countervailing duty (CVD) laws than the AD and CVD Orders
themselves. Following an AD and/or CVD investigation, in which the
United States Department of Commerce (“Commerce”) has found
imported merchandise to be sold for less than fair value and/or
unfairly subsidized, 1 and the International Trade Commission (ITC)
has determined that an industry is materially injured or threatened
with material injury in the United States by sales of that merchandise,
Commerce is directed by statute to issue an AD and/or CVD Order. 2
The “general rule” with respect to an AD determination is that if a
“class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in
the United States at less than its fair value” and is found to be causing
(or threatening) material injury, “then there shall be imposed upon
such merchandise an antidumping duty . . . .” 3 Likewise, in the context
of an affirmative CVD determination finding the existence of a
“countervailable subsidy with respect to the manufacture, production,
or export of a class or kind of merchandise imported, or sold (or likely
to be sold) for importation, into the United States,” the statute says
“there shall be imposed upon such merchandise a countervailing duty
. . . .” 4
Accordingly, perhaps the most important factor in drafting an
AD or CVD Order is making certain that the description of the “class
or kind of foreign merchandise” covered by that Order is sufficiently
specific – covering the merchandise which was found to be “dumped”
in the United States market or unfairly subsidized, as well as causing
material injury to a domestic industry. It is important that the Order
covers the breadth of products that were intended to be covered but is
not so broad that it covers products unrelated to the merchandise
subject to the underlying investigation. In the lexicon of trade
remedies, we call that description of merchandise subject to an AD or
CVD Order the “scope” of the Order.

Final Determinations, 19 U.S.C. § 1673d.
19 U.S.C. § 1673d(c)(2); Final Determinations, 19 U.S.C. § 1671d(c)(2).
3
Imposition of antidumping duties, 19 U.S.C. § 1673 (emphasis added).
4
Countervailing duties imposed, 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (emphasis added).
1
2
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There are in fact three different, well-established proceedings
in the AD and CVD laws which pertain to the scope of an Order. The
first occurs during an AD or CVD investigation and is the procedure
in which Commerce defines the scope, with some possible
modifications implemented as a result of the ITC’s final injury
determination. The second arises after the AD or CVD Order has been
issued and an interested party wants Commerce to determine if a
product is covered by the Order. The third takes center stage when a
product appears to be outside the scope of an Order, but a domestic
industry alleges that a respondent is circumventing the order.
Thereafter, Commerce is required to consider whether the product is
truly outside the scope, and if so, to determine if certain factors exist
to nonetheless draw the product under the umbrella of the Order
through a circumvention determination. This paper will attempt to
shed some light on each of these areas of law, 5 and the procedures
unique to each, 6 while highlighting some legal issues which have been
addressed in the past by the Court of International Trade (“CIT”) and
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).

There are certain outstanding legal and policy issues not addressed in this article, but
it is the author’s hope that one can use this paper as a gateway to understand some of
the more fundamental issues and concepts covering scope matters before Commerce.
6
There is a relatively new fourth area of law which pertains to Commerce’s scopes,
not covered by this paper. On February 24, 2016, the Trade Facilitation and Trade
Enforcement Act of 2015 was signed into law, which contains Title IV – Prevention
of Evasion of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders (short title “Enforce and
Protect Act of 2015,” or “EAPA”). Pub. L. No. 114-125, 130 Stat. 122, 155 (2016).
The EAPA added section 19 U.S.C. §1517, which provides a means by which an
interested party can request that Customs and Border Protection (CBP) investigate
potential evasion of AD and CVD Orders, and if CBP is unable to determine whether
the merchandise at issue is “covered merchandise,” pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§1517(b)(4)(a), it refers the matter to Commerce to make a covered merchandise
determination. Commerce has not yet issued regulations pursuant to this new area of
law, and has received a limited number of EAPA referrals to date. Accordingly, there
is little to reference or analyze with respect to this area of law, unlike the other three
areas discussed in this paper, as it is just in its nascent stage.
5
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DEFINING THE SCOPE
A.

Commerce is Owed Significant Deference in Defining
the Scope

In every investigation, the scope of the merchandise being
investigated is initially set forth in the Petition filed by the allegedly
aggrieved domestic industry (petitioners) requesting the initiation of
an investigation. In general, as the CIT has recognized, Commerce
owes a great deal of deference to the petitioners in defining the scope
because they are experts in their industries and, as the allegedly
aggrieved parties, have personal knowledge of the imported products
causing harm. 7
However, Commerce may modify, amend, or otherwise
change the scope of merchandise being investigated for various
reasons. 8 Ultimately, the Federal Circuit has held that Commerce is
tasked by statute with the “responsibility to determine the proper
scope” of an “investigation and of the antidumping order.” 9 As the
Federal Circuit has explained, an “antidumping investigation is
typically initiated by a petition filed by a domestic industry requesting
that Commerce conduct an investigation into possible dumping” and
the “petition initially determines the scope of the investigation,” but
Commerce “has the inherent power to establish the parameters of the
“Under the statutory scheme, Commerce owes deference to the intent of the proposed
scope of an antidumping investigation as expressed in an antidumping petition. See 19
U.S.C. § 1673; see also 19 U.S.C. § 1673a(b); see also NTN Bearing Corp. of Am. v.
United States, 14 CIT 623, 626, 747 F.Supp. 726, 730 (1990) (‘If the petition is
deemed sufficient, the ITA is statutorily obliged to insure that the proceedings are
maintained in a form which corresponds to the petitioner’s clearly evinced intent and
purpose.’) (citing Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 12 CIT 1025, 700 F. Supp.
538 (1988), aff’d, 898 F.2d 1577, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1990))).” Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade
Action Committee v. United States, 637 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1174, n. 2 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2009) (citing Mitsubishi I and Mitsubishi II).
8
“Commerce retains authority to define the scope of the investigation and may depart
from the scope as proposed by a petition if it determines that petition to be ‘overly
broad, or insufficiently specific to allow proper investigation, or in any other way
defective.’ NTN Bearing Corp., 747 F. Supp. at 731 (citing Torrington Co. v. United
States, 14 CIT 507, 745 F. Supp. 718 (1990), aff’d, 938 F.2d 1276, 1278 (Fed. Cir.
1991)).”
9
See Mitsubishi II, 898 F.2d at 1582.
7
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investigation so that it would not be tied to an initial scope definition
that . . . may not make sense in light of the information available to
[Commerce]or subsequently obtained in the investigation.” 10 This is
because the “purpose of the petition is to propose an investigation,”
while “[a] purpose of the investigation is to determine what
merchandise should be included in the final order.” 11
Thus, the Federal Circuit has acknowledged that Commerce is
granted a “large” amount of discretion to determine “the applicable
scope” of an “order that will be effective to remedy the dumping that
the Administration has found.” 12 It is not uncommon that Commerce
might need to adjust the scope of a petition to address concerns it has
with respect to the ability of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or
Commerce itself, to administer or enforce a scope. Perhaps some of the
proposed scope language might be too broad, or too narrow, or too
confusing to administer at the border. For example, a petitioner in
good faith might propose an exclusion for a “completed product” that
in practice actually enters into the United States not in one shipment
or entry, but in pieces over the span of several months. As CBP would
only apply the exclusion to a “completed” product, the exclusion
would therefore be worthless for all intents and purposes and likely
cause confusion if importers nonetheless request exclusion upon
importation of the individual parts. In another scenario, some
language in a proposed scope might unintentionally cover a steel item
already covered by other AD and CVD orders, forcing Commerce to
modify the language to be assured that no single product enters the
United States covered simultaneously (in full) by two different AD or
two CVD orders. 13
See Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
See Duferco, 296 F.3d at 1096-1097 (citing to sections 19 U.S.C. §§1671a(b)(1),
1671d(a)(1), 1673a(b)(1), and 1673d(a)(1)); see also Tak Fat Trading Company
v. United States, 396 F.3d 1378, 1382-83 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Walgreen Co. v.
United States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citing to Duferco for the
concept that “it is the responsibility of the agency, not those who initiated the
proceedings, to determine the scope of the final orders”).
12
See Mitsubishi II, 898 F.2d at 1583.
13
Such a situation might not be a problem for a product composed of different parts
which are separately covered by different Orders, like, for example, a product
containing both extruded aluminum (one Order), and certain steel products (other
Orders). In that scenario, importers might be able to individually report the different
10
11
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Commerce might also have to remove certain products from
the scope because the ITC has concluded a subset of products in the
scope do not cause injury to the domestic industry. After all, an AD or
CVD Order reflects “merchandise which is both in a class of
merchandise being sold at (less than fair value)” or being unfairly
subsidized “and which is causing material injury to the domestic
industry.” 14 Thus, under that scenario, the scope of the Order would
naturally be smaller than the scope of the petition.
Finally, Commerce might have to tweak the language of the
scope to prevent the possibility of future evasion. As the CIT held in
Mitsubishi I, and affirmed in Mitsubishi II, the Department “has been
vested with authority to administer the antidumping laws in
accordance with the legislative intent. To this end, [Commerce] has a
certain amount of discretion to expand the language of a petition . . .
with the purpose in mind of preventing the intentional evasion or
circumvention of the antidumping duty laws.” 15 Most recently, in
Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, the Federal Circuit affirmed that
Commerce could consider evasion concerns when drafting the scope
of an Order, holding that the “Tariff Act does not require Commerce
to define the ‘class or kind of [foreign] merchandise’ in any particular
manner. Because the Tariff Act is silent in this regard, Commerce has

amounts of materials within the bigger product subject to the different Orders for
purposes of assessing duties. Such an analysis would depend largely on Commerce’s
instructions to CBP.
14
Badger-Powhatan v. United States, 633 F. Supp. 1364, 1370 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1986).
15
See Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 538, 555 (1988); see also
id. at 556 (explaining that Commerce “has the authority to define and/or clarify what
constitutes the subject merchandise to be investigated as set forth in the petition . . .
taking into consideration such factors as . . . the known tactics of foreign industries
attempting to avoid a countervailing duty order”), affirmed by Mitsubishi II, 898 F.2d
at 1582 and 1584. Likewise, in Torrington I, the CIT upheld Commerce’s
determination to “narrow the scope” by finding the existence of five classes or kinds
of merchandise, although the petition had alleged the existence of a single, larger class
or kind of merchandise. Torrington I, 745 F. Supp. at 721 n.4, aff’d Torrington II, 938
F.2d at 1276. The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s judgment, noting additionally
that it would not “disturb” Commerce’s interpretation of the “involved sections of the
antidumping duty laws” unless Commerce’s interpretation was “unreasonable.”
Torrington II, 938 F.2d at 1278 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 837, 843-44 (1984)).
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the authority to fill that gap and define the scope of an order consistent
with the countervailing duty and antidumping duty laws.” 16
B.

The Physical Description of the Class or Kind of
Merchandise

In defining the scope in every single investigation, Commerce
must determine the physical description of the imported products
alleged to have caused an injury to a domestic industry. As the CIT
held in Sunpower, the “statute and the case law instruct that the term
‘class or kind of merchandise’ refers to the products in a particular
proceeding.” 17 19 U.S.C. § 1677(25) defines “subject merchandise” as
“the class or kind of merchandise that is within the scope of an
investigation, a suspension agreement, an order under this subtitle or
section 1303 of this title, or a finding under the Antidumping Act,
1921.” 18 (emphasis added). To be clear, the merchandise within the
scope of an investigation meets the description of the merchandise
initially set forth in the petition. Furthermore, the merchandise may be
called “subject merchandise” throughout an investigation, but that
description might change once the Order is issued, creating a new (and
final) description of “subject merchandise.”
Therefore, as Commerce explained in Sunpower, which the CIT
affirmed, “class or kind of merchandise” does not refer to a “general
type of product” that is somehow separate and removed from the
language of the scope of an investigation or Order. 19 It is instead a
reference to the specific products described in the scope allegedly
causing harm in a specific investigation. Analogizing a scope to a
baked treat everyone enjoys, imagine the general term “blue widgets
from Taiwan” represented by a round cookie. The scope might
include, however, only dark blue widgets five inches or bigger and
light blue widgets two inches or smaller, while excluding widgets
16
Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 909, 917 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (Canadian
Solar).
17
Sunpower Corporation v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 3d 1275, 1286 (Ct. Int’l Trade.
2017) (Sunpower), aff’d in Canadian Solar.
18
19 U.S.C. § 1677(25).
19
Sunpower, 253 F. Supp. 3d. at 1287 (quoting Commerce’s remand redetermination
results in that litigation).
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which are combination of light and dark blue. Suddenly, that “blue
widgets” representative cookie is no longer round, but has multiple
bite marks and cuts throughout, and the result might look more like
an hourglass. This could be true even if in the past there was a revoked
Order covering blue widgets from Taiwan that looked more like a fully
round cookie, or a parallel Order on blue widgets from another
country that takes on an entirely different shape. All these scopes
might be generally described as covering “blue widgets,” but the class
or kind of merchandise being investigated, and upon which an Order
might be placed, can be narrower or broader than past or other current
AD or CVD investigations covering blue widgets. Commerce is under
no obligation in defining the physical description of the subject
merchandise to exclude certain products, or to include additional
products, just because prior or parallel Orders on “blue widgets” did,
or did not, include that merchandise because, as the Federal Circuit
has held, the class or kind of merchandise is “determined by the
order.” 20
In general, an Order provides three explicit elements: (1)
physical descriptions of the products covered by the Order; (2)
physical descriptions of the products explicitly excluded from
coverage by the Order; and (3) references to the Harmonized Tariff
Schedule of the United States subheadings that currently cover the
described merchandise and are used for identification upon import.
For an example, here is the AD Order covering Kegs from Mexico. 21
Scope of the Investigation
The merchandise covered by this investigation are
kegs, vessels, or containers with bodies that are
approximately cylindrical in shape, made from
stainless steel (i.e., steel containing at least 10.5 percent
chromium by weight and less than 1.2 percent carbon
by weight, with or without other elements), and that
are compatible with a “D Sankey” extractor (refillable
stainless steel kegs) with a nominal liquid volume
See Target Corp. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1352, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Target
II”); Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 683, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
21
Refillable Stainless Steel Kegs From Mexico: Antidumping Duty Order, 84 Fed.
Reg. 54,591 (Oct. 10, 2019).
20
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capacity of 10 liters or more, regardless of the type of
finish, gauge, thickness, or grade of stainless steel, and
whether or not covered by or encased in other
materials. Refillable stainless steel kegs may be
imported assembled or unassembled, with or without
all components (including spears, couplers or taps,
necks, collars, and valves), and be filled or unfilled.
“Unassembled” or “unfinished” refillable stainless
steel kegs include drawn stainless steel cylinders that
have been welded to form the body of the keg and
attached to an upper (top) chime and/or lower
(bottom) chime. Unassembled refillable stainless steel
kegs may or may not be welded to a neck, may or may
not have a valve assembly attached, and may be
otherwise complete except for testing, certification,
and/or marking.
Subject merchandise also includes refillable stainless
steel kegs that have been further processed in a third
country, including but not limited to, attachment of
necks, collars, spears or valves, heat treatment,
pickling, passivation, painting, testing, certification or
any other processing that would not otherwise remove
the merchandise from the scope of the investigation if
performed in the country of manufacture of the inscope refillable stainless steel keg.
Specifically excluded are the following:
(1) vessels or containers that are not approximately
cylindrical in nature (e.g., box, “hopper” or “cone”
shaped vessels);
(2) stainless steel kegs, vessels, or containers that have
either a “ball lock” valve system or a “pin lock” valve
system (commonly known as “Cornelius,” “corny” or
“ball lock” kegs);
(3) necks, spears, couplers or taps, collars, and valves
that are not imported with the subject merchandise;
and
(4) stainless steel kegs that are filled with beer, wine, or
other liquid and that are designated by the

V. 28
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Commissioner of Customs as Instruments of
International Traffic within the meaning of section
332(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended.
The merchandise covered by these investigations are
currently classified in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
of the United States (HTSUS) under subheadings
7310.10.0010,
7310.10.0050,
7310.29.0025,
and
7310.29.0050.
These HTSUS subheadings are provided for
convenience and customs purposes; the written
description of the scope of this investigation is
dispositive.
As one can see from the scope of the Kegs from Mexico Order,
the scope starts with a general description of covered merchandise,
then specifically excludes certain merchandise, and finally refers to the
HTSUS subheadings that generally apply to the described
merchandise. Notably, the last sentence of the scope of the Order
includes language which appears in all AD and CVD Orders; an
explicit provision that states that written descriptions of the subject
merchandise are dispositive, not the HTSUS subheadings. The
primary reason this sentence exists is because CBP is frequently called
upon to issue Customs Rulings as to what terms and characteristics
appearing in the HTSUS mean, and it is possible that when a descriptor
in the HTSUS is the same or similar to the narrative of an AD or CVD
Order, CBP might rule in a way on a term or terms that differs from
Commerce’s interpretation or understanding of those same words. 22
This is not to say that Commerce does not sometimes agree with the
CBP interpretation of a word or phrase. In fact, Commerce has even
looked to CBP rulings for insight and guidance in making certain
scope rulings in the past, such as in the scope ruling before the Federal
Circuit in Tak Fat, in which the Court affirmed Commerce’s
determination to look to CBP rulings for guidance on the meaning of
the terms “marinated,” “acidified,” and “pickled.” 23 Nonetheless,
See generally Customs Ruling Online Search System, https://rulings.cbp.gov/home,
(last visited Oct. 15, 2020) (CBP’s NY and HQ Customs rulings are found here).
23
See Tak Fat Trading Company v. United States, 396 F.3d 1378, 1384-86 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Note that when Commerce looked to those terms, it was doing so to interpret
22
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HTSUS subheadings and CBP’s interpretation of those subheadings,
although helpful in assisting the enforcement of AD and CVD Orders,
do not trump the actual physical description of the merchandise
provided in the scope.
Perhaps the greatest challenge with defining the physical
characteristics in a scope is that on one hand, the domestic industry
wants the language to be general enough to cover models or types of
merchandise similar to products causing them injury and that could
easily take the place of current models being dumped or subsidized
once an Order is in place (i.e., evasion or circumvention of the Order).
But on the other hand, Commerce and the ITC require a great deal of
specificity in the scope to address the injurious dumping and
subsidization alleged in the first place. Furthermore, it is common for
a domestic industry to produce certain models of a product, while
importing other models. 24 Obviously, in that scenario, the domestic
industry wants the Order to only cover merchandise that is causing
injury, not merchandise it is importing. Accordingly, to address these

the text of the scope. Commerce did not stop its analysis in that case, though, at a
simplistic “plain meaning” level of analysis, but analyzed the text as well using the
sources listed in 19 CFR 351.225(k)(1), described below.
24
In determining the physical characteristics of the products covered by a scope, one
of the factors Commerce must consider is the domestic like product produced and sold
by the petitioning domestic industry. Sections 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673a(c)(1)(ii) and
(c)(4)(A) state that Commerce may only initiate an investigation if it determines
within twenty days of filing that the “petition has been filed by or on behalf of the
domestic industry, which must “account for at least 25 percent of the total production
of the domestic like product” and support must “account for more than 50 percent of
the production of the domestic like product produced by that portion of the industry.”
Accordingly, Commerce must make its own “domestic like product” determination
separate and apart from the “domestic like product” determination made by the ITC.
See Fujitsu Limited v. United States, 36 F. Supp. 2d 394, 402 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1999).
While Commerce and the ITC must both apply the statutory definition of domestic
like product found at 19 U.S.C. §1677(10), “they do so for different purposes and
pursuant to a separate and distinct authority. In addition, (Commerce’s) determination
is subject to limitations of time and information. Although this may result in different
definitions of the like product, such differences do not render the decision of either
agency contrary to law.” Ni-Resist Piston Inserts from Argentina and the Republic of
Korea: Initiation of Countervailing Duty Investigations, 74 Fed. Reg. 8054, 80558056 (Feb. 23, 2009) (referencing USEC, Inc. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2001)).
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concerns, exclusions play an extremely important role in finding that
necessary balance between general and specific language.
Frequently, but not always, the products listed as “excluded”
in a scope would have been covered by the preceding scope language,
but for the exclusion. By specifically listing models of merchandise not
covered by the scope of the investigation or Order, the “class or kind”
of merchandise subject to the investigation is expressly diminished –
providing clarity to the products covered by the scope, and allowing
the domestic industry and Commerce to focus on the imported
merchandise allegedly causing harm. It is therefore no surprise that
importers and exporters requesting scope rulings after the Order has
been issued frequently argue that their merchandise should be
determined to fall under one or more exclusions listed in the scope of
the Order. Thus, just as it is important that the petitioners and
Commerce draft a general scope description that is accurate and clear,
so too is it extremely vital that all exclusions in the scope are as clearly
articulated as possible. Otherwise, CBP’s ability to administer the
scope upon importation of merchandise, and Commerce’s ability to
make a scope ruling upon request following the issuance of the Order,
become more of a challenge and quite possibly controversial.
Another challenge which petitioners and Commerce
frequently face in defining the scope of an Order is “usage” language.
There are many products that are distinguished and described in the
trade in accordance with their usage and reflect the clear intent of the
products that the petitioners want to have covered. Nonetheless,
Commerce does its best to avoid such language in its scopes. The
reasons for that avoidance are best described through examples, such
as the current AD Order on Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China. 25 The
scope of that Order is extremely detailed and specific, but the
fundamental usage term “bedroom” in the scope narrative proved to
be a challenge for Commerce when wooden furniture meeting all the
physical characteristics of chests of drawers in the scope were
sometimes advertised for use in other rooms in the household and

25
See Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and
Antidumping Duty Order: Wooden Bedroom Furniture From the People’s Republic
of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 329 (January 4, 2005).
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sometimes shown as being used in a bedroom. 26 At that point, the
question faced by Commerce and the Court on appeal was: What
makes furniture used in the bedroom “bedroom furniture” for
purposes of the AD Order? Is it the capacity to store clothing,
particular design features, or something else? 27 As explained below,
the answer to that question was subject to different interpretations by
Commerce and the Court based on the evidence on the record.
Unquestionably, however, the most infamous example of
exclusion language pertains to an exclusion to Petroleum Wax Candles
from China 28 issued in the late 1980s for “certain novelty candles
specially designed for use only in connection with the Christmas
holiday season” and candles associated with “scenes or symbols” for
“religious holidays or special events.” 29 That scope exclusion forced
Commerce to struggle numerous times over whether, for example,
heart and flower shaped candles were included by the Order, as they
could be used and shared on Valentine’s Day but could also be shared
and used all year round. 30 Indeed, there are many stories arising out
of the enforcement of that particular scope in which Commerce teams
had to decide, for example, if a lumpy red candle was more akin to
Sesame Street’s Elmo, a garden gnome, or Santa Claus. For this reason,
Commerce strongly dissuades domestic industries from including
usage language in scopes and takes a critical look at such language if
it is proposed for inclusion in the scope of a petition during
investigation.
C.

The Country of Origin of the Class or Kind of
Merchandise

In addition to the physical description of the products covered
and excluded from the AD or CVD Order, a scope also identifies “the
Ethan Allen Operations, Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1348-53 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2015).
27
Id.
28
Antidumping Duty Order: Petroleum Wax Candles from the People’s Republic of
China, 51 Fed. Reg. 30686 (August 28, 1986).
29
Russ Berrie & Company, Inc. v. United States, 23 C.I.T 429, 430 (July 13, 1999).
30
See id. at 441 (affirming Commerce’s determination that they were not excluded in
that case).
26
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merchandise’s country of origin.” 31 In most investigations, that is not
a significant issue. A blue widget from China made entirely in China
is Chinese in origin, and no one would argue otherwise. However,
sometimes, a product might, in fact, be manufactured in more than one
country – part of the product might be made in one country and then
completed in a second, third, or even fourth country. In that situation,
Commerce might have to conduct a country of origin analysis.
Frequently, the issue arises in an investigation, but sometimes it does
not become a matter for dispute until a scope ruling request has been
made, long after the Order has been issued.
The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, and codified in Section 19
of the United States Code, is silent on a country of origin analysis, but
the Federal Circuit has held that “Commerce’s authority to define the
class or kind of merchandise within the scope of an order encompasses
the authority to determine the country of origin.” 32 Commerce’s
traditional country of origin test is known as the “substantial
transformation” test or analysis. 33 In particular, Commerce generally
uses this analysis to determine whether a product’s country of origin
has changed as a result of processing that occurs in third countries
before a product is imported into the United States. Courts have
upheld Commerce’s substantial transformation analysis, 34 which has,
in different iterations and based on different fact patterns, looked at
factors such as: (1) whether the processed downstream product is a
different class or kind of merchandise than the upstream product; (2)
the technical, physical, and chemical characteristics of the product and
its parts; (3) the intended end-use of the product; (4) the cost of
production and value added to the product as a result of further
processing in third countries; (5) the nature and sophistication of
Canadian Solar, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.3d 909, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
Id. at 917.
33
See Bell Supply Company, LLC v. United States, 888 F.3d 1222, 1228-29 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“A substantial transformation occurs where, ‘as a result of manufacturing or
processing steps . . .[,] the [product] loses its identity and is transformed into a new
product having a new name, character and use.’”) (internal citations omitted).
34
See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 2d 854, 858 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 1998) (“The ‘substantial transformation’ rule provides a yardstick for
determining whether the processes performed on merchandise in a country are of such
significance as to require the resulting merchandise to be considered the product of
the country in which the transformation occurred”).
31
32
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processing in third countries; (6) the level of investment in third
countries; (7) where the essential component of the product (if there is
one) is produced; and/or (8) where the essential characteristics of the
product are imported.
All that being said, Commerce is not required by law to apply
its “substantial transformation” test to determine the country of origin
for purposes of the scope of an Order, and in 2019 the Federal Circuit
affirmed Commerce’s determination to use an alternative “country of
assembly” (of solar panels) test in Canadian Solar. 35 Chinese solar panel
companies had earlier shifted the production of their solar cells to
other countries, such as Taiwan, to avoid the payment of duties when
Commerce had determined that the country of origin for previous AD
and CVD Orders was determined by the fabrication of the solar cell
under the agency’s substantial transformation analysis. 36 In new
petitions, the domestic industry had explained that this shift in
production had largely undermined the effectiveness of the previous
Orders. After contentious new investigations, Commerce concluded
that the application of a different country of origin test was necessary
in the resulting new AD and CVD Orders to address injurious
dumping and subsidization of solar panels exported to the United
States. 37 The Federal Circuit agreed, holding that “evasion concerns
constitute a reasoned explanation for departing from Commerce’s
previous practice.” 38
Thus, in determining the scope of an Order, Commerce must
consider not just the physical descriptions of the merchandise at issue,
but in some cases also the country of origin of the merchandise, 39
taking into consideration the best methodology available to address
Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 917.
See id. at 919.
37
Id. at 915-20. See Certain Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Products From the
People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty Order; and Amended Final
Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination and Countervailing Duty Order, 80
Fed. Reg. 8,592 (Feb. 18, 2015).
38
Canadian Solar, 918 F.3d at 919.
39
It is worth pointing out that Commerce is not bound by the country of origin
determinations of other agencies, such as CBP. Sometimes confusion arises out of the
fact that CBP might conclude a product has a different country of origin from that
determined by Commerce. Each agency’s country of origin analysis is based on
different factors for different reasons.
35
36
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the alleged injurious dumping and subsidization of certain imported
products.
III.

INTERPRETING THE SCOPE OF AN AD OR CVD ORDER
THROUGH A SCOPE RULING

Once the AD or CVD Order has been issued, the scope is like
hardened concrete. It is changeable only through a changed
circumstances review, 40 and then only by shrinking the amount of
products covered by the scope as originally set forth in the Order, and
then usually only with the consent of the injured domestic parties.
Nonetheless, Commerce frequently is called upon to issue a “scope
ruling” to determine if something is or is not covered by the scope of
the Order at issue. Section 19 U.S.C. §1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi) provides that
the CIT has jurisdiction to review “(a) determination by the
administering authority as to whether a particular type of merchandise
is within the class or kind of merchandise described in an existing
finding of dumping or antidumping or countervailing duty order.” 41
Like other Commerce determinations, the CIT and Federal Circuit are
directed by the statute to uphold Commerce’s determinations,
findings, or conclusions unless they are “unsupported by substantial
evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” 42
Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 43
Other than those provisions, no other section of the statute
directly applies to Commerce’s scope rulings. The “class or kind”
provisions described in the first section above directly applies only to
the process of defining the scope in the underlying investigation. The
circumvention provision, as discussed below, by necessity requires
that Commerce initially determine if a product is, or is not, covered by
the scope of an Order, but that analysis is conducted only in the context

See 19 U.S.C. § 1675(b)(1).
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2)(B)(vi).
42
Judicial review in countervailing duty and antidumping duty proceedings, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
43
A.L. Patterson, Inc. v. United States, 585 Fed. Appx. 778, 781–82 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
40
41
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of making a circumvention determination. 44 Accordingly, Commerce’s
scope ruling proceedings are governed almost entirely by its scope
ruling regulations found in 19 C.F.R. 351.225.
A.

The Scope Ruling Regulations

Section 225(a) of the scope regulations provides the processes
by which an interested party may make a request for a scope inquiry,
section (b) allows for Commerce to self-initiate, and section (c)
describes the contents of an application for a scope ruling and
deadlines. For purposes of this paper, however, it is section (d) that is
particularly relevant because it states that if Commerce can
“determine, based solely upon the application and the descriptions of
the merchandise referred to in paragraph (k)(1) of this section whether
a product is included within the scope of an order” Commerce “will
issue a final ruling as to whether the product is included within the
order . . . .” Section (k) is arguably the most significant provision within
Section 225, and (k)(1) in particular lists four sources of information
Commerce should consider in making a determination under section
(d): “The descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the
initial investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary (including
prior scope determinations) and the Commission.”
By its terms, one might infer from the text of section 225(d) that
any information on the record which cannot be found in the scope
application or in one of the (k)(1) sources of information therefore
cannot be considered for purposes of a determination under that
provision, but such a reading directly conflicts with the requirements
of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i) that Commerce’s determinations be
based on the “substantial evidence” on the record. This issue arose in
the long and drawn out litigation covering “curtain walls,” which were
imported in multiple parts and in multiple entries over a lengthy
period of time to the United States under AD and CVD Orders
covering Aluminum Extrusions from China. 45 The court held that
because the record included a “letter, written by Petitioners
See Prevention of Circumvention of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders,
19 U.S.C. § 1677j.
45
Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 3d 1331,
1351 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016) (“Yuanda I”).
44
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specifically for this scope proceeding, supporting Commerce’s
position, and a news article quoting Petitioner’s counsel . . .” that were
“not (k)(1) materials,” “neither of these documents” were
“appropriate” for Commerce to consider as part of its analysis. 46
Commerce explained on remand that the referenced “news article”
was actually attached to the scope request application, and therefore
was appropriate for consideration under section 225(d), and that the
Petitioner’s letter was not one of those factors. Nonetheless, the letter
was a relevant part of the administrative record, and therefore, under
19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i), Commerce could not just ignore that
record evidence in making its determination. 47 In time, the CIT upheld
Commerce’s underlying scope ruling, as further analyzed on
remand, 48 and on appeal, in 2019, the Federal Circuit held that
Commerce’s scope ruling was supported by substantial evidence on
the record and otherwise in accordance with law. 49 Thus, although
section 225(d) does allow for Commerce to make a determination
based on a smaller administrative record than it would otherwise have
before it, were it to invite comment and briefing from the parties, it
does not permit the agency to outright ignore information that is
already on the record at the time it makes its scope ruling
determination.
The remainder of section 225 provides notice and comment
requirements for scope rulings, allows for consolidation of scope
inquiries, and directs Commerce to order suspension of liquidation of
imports upon entry under various scenarios. But, for purposes of this
paper, section 225(k)(2) is key. 50 Section 225(k)(2) provides that if the
46

Id.
Shenyang Yuanda v. United States, Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
Court Remand, filed pursuant to Consol. Court No. 14-00106, dated May 12, 2016, at
22 (found at enforcement.trade.gov/remands/16-11.pdf). In a subsequent remand,
filed in the same litigation, pursuant to Court Order on October 6, 2016, Commerce
filed a subsequent Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand on
January 19, 2017, where it addressed this matter for the Court at pages 52 and 53 of
the remand redetermination.
48
Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1209
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2017) (“Yuanda II”).
49
Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 918 F.3d 1355, 136668 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (“Yuanda III”).
50
See 19 U.S.C. §§ 225(e), (f), (l), (m), (n) and (o).
47

56

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 28

(k)(1) factors and the application are “not dispositive,” Commerce
“will further consider” the following: “(i) The physical characteristics
of the product; (ii) The expectations of the ultimate purchasers; (iii) The
ultimate use of the product; (iv) The channels of trade in which the
product is sold; and (v) The manner in which the product is advertised
and displayed.” These factors are commonly referred to as the
Diversified Products factors, named after a 1983 CIT case in which the
Court affirmed Commerce’s use of the first four of those listed
criteria. 51 As the regulation provides, Commerce considers these
factors only as a last step in analyzing whether or not merchandise is
subject to an Order.
B.

The Federal Circuit’s Plain Meaning Rule

In Duferco, the Federal Circuit explained that it “grants
significant deference to Commerce’s own interpretation of (its)
orders,” 52 but stressed that unlike in the procedures defining a scope
in an investigation, “Commerce cannot ‘interpret’ an antidumping
order so as to change the scope of that order, nor can Commerce
interpret an order in a manner contrary to its terms.” 53 Indeed, the
Federal Circuit has stated in multiple holdings that in making a scope
ruling, Commerce must first consider the “plain language of the
Orders,” calling the language of the scopes “the cornerstone” of “any
scope determination. 54 This line of reasoning has unfortunately
resulted in at least three different interpretations of (and/or by) the
Federal Circuit’s holding that Commerce must first consider the plain
meaning of scope before looking to the (k)(1) sources of information,
and what the courts must consider when Commerce has done a (k)(1)
and/or (k)(2) analysis.
51
See Diversified Products Corp. v. United States, 572 F. Supp. 883, 889 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 1983).
52
See Duferco Steel, Inc. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1087, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(citing Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’n, Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
53
Id. at 1095 (quoting Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1068, 1072
(Fed. Cir. 2001)).
54
See Walgreen Co. v. United States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also,
e.g., Shenyang Yuanda Alum. Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 776 F.3d 1351, 1356
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (“Yuanda 2015”).
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Under all three interpretations, there is no disagreement that
Commerce must first consider the plain, unambiguous meaning of the
scope of the Orders. Nonetheless, under the Federal Circuit’s holding
in Fedmet, because the plain language is “paramount,” in “reviewing
the plain language of a duty order,” “Commerce must consider the
descriptions of the merchandise contained in the petition, the initial
investigation, and the determinations of the Secretary (including prior
determinations) and the Commission.” 55 In other words, under the
Federal Circuit’s holding in Fedmet, Commerce cannot ignore the (k)(1)
sources of information, but must always consider those sources in
analyzing the plain language of the scope of an Order to determine if
the language is unambiguous.
Under the second class of cases, Commerce can make a
determination based on the plain meaning of the scope, (sometimes
referred to informally as a “k(0)” analysis by parties to Commerce’s
proceedings), but if Commerce determines to also consider (k)(1)
sources of information, then the CIT and Federal Circuit must consider
those sources as well in its holding. For example, in Wheatland Tube Co.
v. United States, the Federal Circuit held that “because the description
of the merchandise contained in the” Orders as well as “the initial
investigation” was “unambiguous,” “Commerce was not required to
examine the physical characteristics of the accused product, the
expectations of the ultimate purchasers, the ultimate use of the accused
product, or the channels of trade” (i.e., the (k)(2) factors). 56 In that case,
Commerce’s interpretation of the scope was considered in tandem
with additional regulatory factors, such as the initial investigation
record, and not instead of those factors. Likewise, in its 2015 Shandong
Yuanda holding, after affirming Commerce’s determination that
Yuanda’s merchandise was “within the plan language of the Orders,”
the Federal Circuit then turned to the (k)(1) factors and explained that
“[i]n addition to the plain language of the Orders,” Commerce “will
also consider the descriptions of the merchandise contained in the
petition, the initial investigation, and the prior determinations of
Commerce and the ITC.” 57 Subsequently, they affirmed Commerce’s
(k)(1) analysis as well. Although the language quoted suggests the
Fedmet Res. Corp. v. United States, 755 F.3d 912, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
Wheatland Tube Company v. United States, 161 F.3d 1365, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
57
Yuanda 2015, 776 F.3d at 1357-58 (emphasis added).
55
56
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Court was saying that it “will consider” both steps of analysis, the
sequence of the Court’s analysis and holdings suggested that these
steps were considered separately because Commerce had considered
both the plain language and the (k)(1) sources of information.
Even more recently, as part of this second class of cases, in
Meridian Products, LLC v. United States, the Federal Circuit stressed that
if the “scope is unambiguous, it governs,” but that “the question of
whether the unambiguous terms of a scope control the inquiry, or
whether some ambiguity exists, is a question of law that” the Court
reviews “de novo.” 58 The Federal Circuit explained that “Scope orders
are interpreted with the aid of” other sources “as described by” section
(k)(1) of the agency’s regulation, and the Court then, as part of its
analysis, reviewed the factors relied upon by Commerce, such as prior
scope determinations, to conclude that the language of the scope was
“unambiguous.” 59
In all of these decisions from the second class of cases, the
Federal Circuit seemed to indicate that if Commerce considered just
the plain meaning, the Court would also stop its analysis there. On the
other hand, if Commerce considered both the plain meaning of the
scope as well as the (k)(1) sources of information in making its scope
determination, then the Court signified that it would also consider
both the language as well as the (k)(1) sources of information,
consistent with the substantial evidence on the record standard, set
forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i).
These decisions contrast with a third strain of cases, such as the
Federal Circuit’s 2012 decision in Arcelormittal. 60 The litigation
pertained to the AD Order on Stainless Steel Plate in Coils (SSPC) from
Belgium. 61 Key to the dispute was the scope language covering
products which were “4.75 mm or more in thickness.” 62 Years earlier,
in an investigation of certain cut-to-length carbon steel plates from
South Africa, Commerce determined that the same language referred
Meridian Prod., LLC v. United States, 851 F.3d 1375, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Id. at 1382.
60
Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium v. United States, 694 F.3d 82 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
61
Notice of Amended Antidumping Duty Orders; Certain Stainless Steel Plate in Coils
from Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Taiwan, 68
Fed. Reg. 11,520 (Mar. 11, 2003).
62
Arcelormittal, 694 F. 3d at 86-7.
58
59
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to actual thickness and not nominal thickness. 63 Nonetheless, in the
scope ruling at issue in this case, Commerce determined the language
referred to “SSPC having a nominal thickness of 4.75 mm but an actual
thickness of less than 4.75 mm.” 64 In the end, the Federal Circuit
overturned Commerce’s scope ruling that the merchandise at issue
was covered by the scope of the AD Order, which was based on a
conclusion that the scope language was ambiguous, the (k)(1) sources
of information were not determinative, and that the (k)(2) factors
supported finding the product to be subject merchandise. The Federal
Circuit held that Commerce had unlawfully enlarged the scope
through its new interpretation, because: “[o]ver the course of five
years, Commerce repeatedly reassured” the exporter “that nominal
merchandise as such was excluded from the scope of the order.” 65
Significantly, the Federal Circuit pointedly emphasized “the first step
in a scope ruling proceeding is to determine whether the governing
language is in fact ambiguous, and thus requires analysis of the
regulatory factors previously outlined. If it is not ambiguous, the plain
meaning of the language governs.” 66 The Court then went on to look
at three factors in determining if the plain language was unambiguous:
(1) the text of the scope; (2) “trade usage” (stating that “a finding of no
ambiguity for unmodified numbers may be rebutted by sufficient
evidence showing that actual measurements are not customarily used
in the relevant industry”); and (3) Commerce’s previous interpretation
of the same language in the 1997 South African carbon steel plate AD
Order. 67 The Court did not consider Commerce’s (k)(1) or (k)(2)
analysis, but determined on the basis of these three factors alone that
the scope was unambiguous, and therefore Commerce’s scope ruling
was “contrary to the plain language of the order.” 68
More recently, in OMG, Inc. v. United States, the CIT, similar to
the Federal Circuit’s approach in Arcelormittal, abstained from
consideration of Commerce’s (k)(1) analysis and instead determined
63
Notice of Final Determination of Sales of Less than Fair Value: Certain Cut-toLength Carbon Steel Plate from South Africa, 62 Fed. Reg. 61,731 (Nov. 19, 1997).
64
Arcelormittal, 694 F. 3d at 83-4.
65
Id. at 90.
66
Id. at 87.
67
Id. at 88.
68
Id. at 84.
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that the plain meaning did not support Commerce’s determination
and ended its analysis there. 69 In the facts of that particular litigation,
Commerce had issued a scope ruling in which it determined that both
the plain meaning of the AD and CVD Orders covering Certain Steel
Nails from Vietnam, 70 as well as the (k)(1) sources of information,
supported its determination that certain zinc anchors were steel
nails. 71 The Court, citing to traditional statutory tools of interpretation,
looked to the definition of a “nail” as defined by the American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, which had not been
analyzed by Commerce in the scope ruling, as well as certain examples
of trade usage which were on the record that showed some “industry
actors categorize anchors with steel pins as anchors rather than as
nails,” 72 and overturned Commerce’s scope ruling as inconsistent with
the “plain meaning of the word ‘nail.’” 73 The Court did not reach
Commerce’s analysis of the(k)(1) sources of information because the
Court found that the Federal Circuit has concluded that “if the terms
of” an order “are unambiguous, then those terms govern.” 74
Commerce raised its record evidence concerns with the Court on
remand, but the Court called those concerns “not meritorious,”
explaining that its interpretation of the plain meaning of the scope
language was based in part on an analysis of the phrase “two or more
pieces” and was supported by trade usage on the record. 75
The Federal Circuit affirmed the CIT’s reliance on the
dictionary to determine the “plain meaning” in OMG CAFC. Looking
to Commerce’s current regulations, the Federal Circuit pointed out
that section 351.225(a)(1) of those regulations indicates that scope

OMG, Inc. v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1262, 1268 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2018)
[hereinafter OMG], aff’d, 972 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2020) [hereinafter OMG CAFC].
70
See Certain Steel Nails from the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Sultanate of
Oman, Taiwan, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: Antidumping Duty Orders, 80
Fed. Reg. 39,994 (July 13, 2015).
71
OMG, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1268.
72
Id.
73
OMG, 321 F. Supp. 3d at 1268.
74
Id. at 1264. Surprisingly, for support of its contention, the Court cited to Tak Fat, a
case in which Commerce had, in fact, analyzed (k)(1) factors and the Federal Circuit
considered those factors as part of its holding. Tak Fat, 396 F.3d at 1382.
75
OMG, 389 F. Supp. 3d at 1314.
69
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rulings are intended to “clarify” the scope of an order. 76 The Federal
Circuit held that therefore under that idea of “clarification” of the text,
the Court was required to “consider ambiguity of the Orders’ scope
language in the context of anchors.” 77 The Court held that a
determination of whether or not the scope was ambiguous was a
“question of fact reviewed for substantial evidence,” and that it
determined that under the description of the products in this scope,
the facts supporting the finding of the products to be non-subject
merchandise were unambiguous. 78 With respect to the “plain
meaning” and “dictionary” arguments, the Federal Circuit held that
under the current regulations, “the first step is to determine whether
the governing language is in fact ambiguous,” and if it is not
ambiguous, the “plain meaning of the language governs.” 79 The
Federal Circuit held in that case that only if the language is ambiguous,
does it “next consider the regulatory history, as contained in the socalled (k)(1) materials.” 80 The Court held that under its interpretation
of the “plain meaning rule” test, “as a threshold matter, the CIT may
consult dictionary definitions to assist in determining the plain
meaning in an antidumping or countervailing duty order,” and that
although “some of the dictionary definitions the CIT considered (in
this case were), indeed narrower than the Orders’ scope language, the
CIT did not rest its conclusion on those differences” in this case. 81
As reflected in these three different interpretations of the
application of the Federal Circuit’s plain meaning rule holdings, the
problem with any “plain meaning” test is that language is imperfect,
and one person’s idea of the “plain meaning,” might be another
person’s idea of ambiguity. As one author explained, “the plain
meaning rule . . . ties the interpretation of” text to “subjective notions
of what words mean in language and prevents parties from submitting
evidence of alternate meanings that may be publicly used and
acknowledged, but not set forth in a standard dictionary. Furthermore,
the plain meaning rule (or at least unsophisticated versions of it) relies
OMG CAFC, 972 F.3d at *8.
Id. at *9.
78
Id. at *9-10.
79
Id. at *9.
80
Id.
81
Id. at *15-17
76
77
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upon the notion that words and phrases can, standing alone, have a
single unequivocal meaning--a notion that has been thoroughly
debunked by modern scholars who study language.” 82 In addition, the
presumption of a “plain” meaning to words in dispute can create
serious problems, as starkly reflected in OMG CAFC, wherein the
exporters were convinced that their interpretation was clear and
unambiguous, while Commerce was convinced that its interpretation
was clear and unambiguous. As explained above, the Federal Circuit
held that it agreed with both parties that the plain language was
unambiguous, 83 and then sided with the exporters’ interpretation.
However, objectively, logic would seem to suggest that if there are two
interpretations of a scope which are both substantiated by facts and
legally credible arguments, then perhaps in truth the “plain meaning”
of the scope is not so “plain” at all.
In any case, arguably, any interpretation of the Federal
Circuit’s plain meaning rule that would permit a scope analysis that
does not take into consideration the entirety of record evidence at the
time the scope ruling is issued by Commerce is inconsistent with the
substantial evidence on the record standard set forth in 19 U.S.C. §
1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). However, the language used by the Federal Circuit
and the CIT in multiple cases does seem to suggest that the plain
meaning rule analysis could possibly be considered a zero sum game
– one allowing Commerce to forgo an analysis under section 225(k)
entirely, even if the substantial evidence on the record supports the
existence of ambiguity in the text of the scope. It is also unclear how
such an interpretation is consistent with the text of the regulation itself,
as section 225(k) does not describe a plain meaning rule that ignores
entirely the application of the (k)(1) sources of information. However,
such an interpretation is certainly logical and practical in those
situations when, for example, it is unequivocally clear to Commerce
that a scope is unambiguous and no party disagrees on the record with
a particular interpretation. In any case, as these various CIT and
Federal Circuit holdings show, this legal interpretation of the current
regulations and the Federal Circuit’s plain meaning rule appears to
82
Aaron D. Goldstein, The Public Meaning Rule: Reconciling Meaning, Intent and
Contract Interpretation, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 73, 75 (2013).
83
OMG CAFC, 972 F.3d at *10.
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remain, as of 2020, an outstanding source of disagreement, confusion,
or at minimum, inconsistency, in the courts.
On August 13, 2020, Commerce proposed extensive
modifications and revisions to its scope and circumvention
regulations. 84 This paper does not discuss most of those modifications
because they are not yet final as of the writing of this document and
could undergo further changes before being finalized. Many of the
Proposed Modifications codify Commerce’s existing practice in different
areas, such as the mixed media analysis described below. 85 However,
there are some important proposed differences, including changes to
19 CFR 351.225(a) and (k) to address the obvious “plain meaning rule”
problem. As Commerce explained in the Preamble to the Proposed
Modifications, “courts have tried to use” “the term ‘clarify’ in current
paragraph (a),” “to draw a distinction between scope language which
is ‘unambiguous’ and therefore does not require ‘clarification’ under
the section 351.225 procedures, and scope language which is
‘ambiguous’ and does require such ‘clarification.’” 86 Commerce
explained that scope rulings are “intended to cover a wide variety of
scope questions and are not intended to be restrictive to only those
scenarios in which certain language in the scope requires
‘clarification.’” 87 Accordingly, Commerce’s proposal removes the term
“clarify” from 19 CFR 351.225(a).
In addition, Commerce has proposed revising section (k) to
“codify” the Federal Circuit’s “judicially created affirmed framework,
explaining that the primary analysis in any scope inquiry is the
language of the scope itself.” 88 However, rather than draw a bright line
between the text of the scope and the (k)(1) sources, as the Federal
Circuit has done in certain, but not all, cases, Commerce explained that
the revised paragraph (k) would indicate that “in considering the plain
language of the scope, Commerce, at its discretion, could also consider
the underlying petition, Commerce’s investigation, prior Commerce
84
See Regulations to Improve Administration and Enforcement of Antidumping and
Countervailing Duty Laws: Proposed Rule; Request for Comments, 85 Fed. Reg.
49,472 (August 13, 2020) (Proposed Modifications).
85
See id. at 49,497.
86
See id. at 49,476 -77.
87
Id. at 49,477.
88
Id. at 49,480.
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determinations (including, but not limited to prior scope rulings,
memoranda, or clarifications), and determinations of the ITC.” 89 In
other words, rather than treating a plain meaning analysis as separate
from the substantial evidence on the record as to the meaning of those
terms, the proposed regulations would codify that the sources
appearing in (k)(1) are interpretive tools themselves used to determine
if the language is ambiguous or unambiguous in the first place. In
addition, Commerce explained in the Preamble to the Proposed
Modifications that “Commerce could also consider traditional
interpretive tools, such as a dictionary and industry usage of a
particular word or phrase, or other record evidence, to provide context
and understanding in considering the plain language of the scope.
However, in the event of a conflict between these interpretive tools or
other record evidence and the sources identified in paragraph (k)(1),
Commerce would adopt the interpretation supported by the (k)(1)
sources.” 90 As noted, these regulatory changes are merely proposed as
of the writing of this paper, and it is possible that they may undergo
further revision before they are finalized, likely in 2021.
C.

Judicial Deference Over (k)(1) and (k)(2)
Determinations

With respect to Commerce’s (k)(1) and (k)(2) analyses, the
degree of deference that the CIT and the Federal Circuit give the
agency clearly depends on the facts of the case, the thoroughness of
Commerce’s analysis, and the factors the court believes to be of the
greatest significance. Courts frequently affirm Commerce’s scope
analysis, but there have been several cases in which a court overturned
the agency based on a different view of the relevance and prioritization
of the facts on the administrative record. For example, in the
aforementioned Ethan Allen litigation, Commerce received a scope
request for four types of chests of drawers allegedly manufactured and
marketed for use in a living room and hallway, rather than a
bedroom. 91 One chest in particular was sold as part of a furniture set,
Id. at 49,480-81.
Id. at 49,481.
91
Ethan Allen Operations, Inc. v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 3d 1342, 1345 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2015).
89
90
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was comparable in size and storage capacity to standard bedroom
chests, and Commerce placed on the record a picture from Ethan
Allen’s website that showed furniture from that set being used in a
bedroom and five pictures from Ethan Allen’s Facebook page showing
the chest itself being used in a bedroom setting. 92 Commerce
determined that the (k)(1) sources of information were not dispositive
with respect to that chest, and applied a (k)(2) analysis, finding the
chest to be covered by the scope of the Wooden Bedroom Furniture from
China Order under the Diversified Products factors. 93 On the other hand,
with respect to the other three chests that were sold as “stand alone”
chests, Commerce determined that each chest was subject to the order
based on a (k)(1) analysis. 94
In its scope ruling on all four chests, Ethan Allen argued that
Commerce should make a determination based almost entirely on the
“design” elements of the chests, such as the cut and style of the chest
sides and feet. Commerce did not make that its primary focus,
explaining that furniture design is a subjective element not included in
the (k)(1) sources of information and only one element among many in
an analysis based on the (k)(2) factors.
On appeal, the CIT, on the other hand, had no such problem
giving priority to the design elements of the chests. The Court was
persuaded by Ethan Allen’s claims that the furniture set was
“designed for use in the living room” after reviewing the record
evidence, and therefore held that Commerce should have applied only
a (k)(1) analysis to the first chest, 95 while each of the “stand alone”
chests had “qualities of both a wooden bedroom chest (ability to store
clothing) and a wooden living room chest (decorative),” and therefore
Commerce should have applied a (k)(2) analysis to those chests. 96 On
remand, Commerce determined that each chest should be excluded
from the scope of the Order, based almost entirely on the Court’s
holdings that they were each “designed” for use outside of the

Id. at 1345-48.
See id.
94
See id. at 1348-49.
95
Id. at 1351-52.
96
Ethan Allen, 121 F. Supp. 3d at 1348-51.
92
93
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bedroom or contained non-bedroom decorative features, and the
Court affirmed that conclusion. 97
In Ethan Allen, Commerce and the Court each had the
same facts before them. However, they disagreed that the record
objectively supported Ethan Allen’s claims that despite the company’s
website and Facebook posts showing the chests and furniture sets at
issue being used in bedrooms, and the fact that all the chests at issue
could store clothing (a requirement found in the scope itself), certain
design elements were key to distinguishing those chests from
“wooden bedroom furniture” subject to the scope of the Order at issue.
This is a good example to show that in many scope ruling cases on
appeal, it is not the existence of facts themselves on the record that are
in dispute, but the priority and relevance assigned to each of those
facts by Commerce that leads the CIT and Federal Circuit to affirm or
overturn Commerce’s determinations under sections 225(k)(1) and
(k)(2).
D.

Commerce’s Mixed Media Analysis

Most scope rulings involve a review of individual products
under section 225(k), but sometimes Commerce is called upon to
review products which are components in a larger collection of
merchandise. For example, in Walgreen, the Federal Circuit addressed
a scope ruling pertaining to the AD Order on Tissue Paper from China 98
in which the tissue paper was contained in Walgreen’s “Gift Bag to
Go” gift bag sets that also contained a gift bag and crinkle bow. 99 In
accordance with its practice, Commerce applied its “mixed media”
analysis, first determining whether the gift bag was a stand-alone
“unique” product, or “merely subject merchandise packaged with
non-subject merchandise.” 100 Then, once it determined that the gift
bags met the latter description, Commerce determined that the tissue
Ethan Allen Operations, Inc. v. United States, No. 14-00147 (Ct. Int’l Trade Feb.
29, 2016).
98
Notice of Amended Final Determination of Sales at Less than Fair Value and
Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Tissue Paper Products from the People’s Republic
of China, 70 Fed. Reg. 16223 (March 30, 2005).
99
Walgreen Co. of Deerfield, IL v. United States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
100
Id.
97
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paper components of the gift bags were subject to the AD Order, in
accordance with 19 CFR 351.225(k)(1). 101 The Federal Circuit affirmed
Commerce’s analysis, holding that because “the gift bag sets did not
interact in any way or otherwise represent a unique product,” and “the
tissue paper contained therein retained its individual character,”
Commerce “properly determined, based on the (k)(1) criteria and the
language of the Final Order,” that the tissue paper was covered by the
Tissue Paper from China AD Order. 102
Subsequently, in Mid-Continent Nail Corp. v. United States,
Commerce’s “mixed media” analysis was again before the Federal
Circuit, this time in a case involving 50 nails contained in a tool kit,
alongside screwdrivers, measuring tapes, hammers, screws, tacks and
hooks. 103 In its scope ruling on the AD Order on Nails from China, 104
Commerce applied a (k)(2) analysis, finding that because the quantity
of nails was small, and the nails were not advertised separate from the
tool kits, the ultimate expectations of customers would not be to pay
for the entire tool kits just to get the nails. 105 Thus, Commerce
determined that nails should be excluded from the Order. However,
the Federal Circuit held that because the “parties agree[d] that the
merchandise – the nails within the tool kits” were covered by “the
literal terms of the order,” the appropriate analysis for Commerce to
conduct was to “proceed to the next step and decide whether the
inclusion of the merchandise within a mixed media item takes it
outside the scope of the order.” 106 The Court analyzed both the
language of the scope of the Order, as well as the (k)(1) sources, and
concluded that there was nothing in either step of analysis “to suggest
that the literal language of the order should not govern” in the mixed
media case before it. 107 The issue was remanded to Commerce, and in
the end, Commerce determined to examine the nails themselves,
without regard for the toolkit. Commerce concluded that they were
Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1356-57.
103
Mid-Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 725 F.3d 1295, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
104
Notice of Antidumping Duty Order: Certain Steel Nails from the People’s Republic
of China, 73 Fed. Reg. 44, 961–62 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Steel Nails from China].
105
See id.
106
Mid-Continent Nail Corp., 725 F.3d. at 1303.
107
Id.
101
102
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covered by the Order, which the CIT affirmed as consistent with the
Federal Circuit’s holding. 108
More recently, in Star Pipe Products v. United States, the CIT had
before it a challenge to Commerce’s scope ruling covering steel
threaded rod components, which the exporter acknowledged would
be subject to the AD Order on Steel Threaded Rod from China 109 if
imported alone. The components were packaged in “joint restraint
kits” that also contained a combination of castings, bolts, bolt nuts, and
washers. 110 In accordance with the analysis set forth in Mid-Continent,
Commerce first determined that the STR components were
“presumptively in-scope” based on the plain reading of the scope of
the Order. 111 The Court then found the record evidence did not
support a determination that presumption of inclusion had been
overcome by their inclusion in the joint restraint kits. 112 The CIT
upheld Commerce’s determination, noting that Commerce has the
discretion under the “mixed media kit” analysis to determine the
“parameters” for deciding what information is necessary to overcome
a presumption that a product is in-scope, and that in this case,
Commerce’s determination that the “presumption of inclusion was not
overcome” was supported by substantial evidence and in accordance
with law. 113
On the other hand, in the August 2019 decision in Trendium
Pool Products, Inc. v. United States, the CIT considered, and then
remanded, Commerce’s application of the Mid-Continent two-step
analysis in a scope ruling covering pool kits and pool walls which
contained Corrosion Resistant Steel (“CORE”) from Italy and China. 114

Mid-Continent Nail Corp. v. United States, 61 F. Supp. 3d 1287, 1289 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2015).
109
See Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People’s Republic of China, 74 Fed. Reg.
17,154 (Apr. 14, 2009).
110
Star Pipe Products v. United States, 393 F. Supp. 3d 1200, 1205 (Ct. Int’l Trade
July 8, 2019).
111
Id. at 1211.
112
Id.
113
Star Pipe, 393 F. Supp. 3d at 1212-14.
114
Trendium Pool Products, Inc. v. United States, Slip Op. 19-113 (Ct. Int’l Trade
Aug. 20, 2019). See also Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products From India, Italy,
the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan: Amended Final
108
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As part of its analysis, Commerce first determined whether the CORE
included in a larger product item was covered by the literal terms of
the Orders, and then analyzed whether the component’s inclusion in a
larger product should result in the component’s exclusion from the
scope of the Orders, based on the section 225(k) factors. After
reviewing the mill certificates, technical diagrams, and narrative
descriptions provided by Trendium, Commerce concluded that the
individual components of the pool kits fabricated from Italian and
Chinese CORE fell within the plain language of the scope of the
Orders. Then, Commerce analyzed whether packaging components
manufactured from subject CORE in a kit with non-subject
components would necessarily remove the former from the scope of
the Orders. Because the Orders did not specify whether the Chineseand Italian-origin CORE components at issue would be subject to the
Orders when packaged or included with non-subject merchandise,
Commerce reviewed the (k)(1) sources of information, including the
petitions and ITC injury reports. Commerce determined, pursuant to
its analysis of the (k)(1) sources, that it had been contemplated that
CORE would not cease to be subject merchandise if incorporated into
larger products for various reasons, and therefore the COREfabricated pool components at issue were: (1) covered by the literal
scope of the Italian and Chinese Orders, and (2) their inclusion in the
pool kits did not remove them from the scopes of those Orders. 115
The Court in Trendium disagreed with Commerce’s scope
ruling. It held that the Orders at issue covered “CORE,” but “not
finished pool products that are no longer being used as a raw input”
and that “nothing on the record of the original investigation,” in its
review of the record evidence, “demonstrates that Petitioners intended
to include fully finished downstream products as part of the scope of
the investigation.” 116 The Government argued that the plain language
of the Orders contemplated the type of “further processing” which
these pool sides went through, but the Court did not agree with that
interpretation; holding that the processing in this case “transformed”
the CORE components “from a raw input into a finished product,”
Affirmative Antidumping Determination for India and Taiwan, and Antidumping
Duty Orders, 81 Fed. Reg. 48,390 (July 25, 2016).
115
See Trendium at *11-15.
116
Id. at *9-10.
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thereby placing the products outside the scope of the CORE Orders. 117
To be clear, the Court did not actually apply a substantial
transformation test, but concluded that “Trendium’s substantial
processing … creates a finished product fit only for use in Trendium’s
pools,” and because “[p]ools are a product that is absent from the plain
language of the Order,” that processing was “sufficient to bring
Trendium’s product outside the scope of the Order.” 118
Furthermore, the Court held that Commerce had erred in
relying on Mid-Continent and conducting the two-step analysis
explained therein, because, in its assessment, the pool kits and walls
were not “merely a combination of subject and nonsubject
merchandise,” (i.e. a “mixed media”), but instead the CORE at issue
were integrated into pools – singular, unitary items, not appropriately
analyzed under the Mid-Continent analysis. 119
Both of these holdings make the Trendium analysis interesting
with respect to the overall case law and practice of scope rulings. First,
the Court essentially held that before the two-part test of Mid-Content
can be applied, Commerce must first determine if the components at
issue have been integrated into the larger merchandise to create a
product which is unique, and therefore not covered by the scope of the
Order(s) at issue, or if they are part of a “mixed media,” similar to the
first step of Commerce’s analysis affirmed by the Federal Circuit in
Walgreen. 120 This interpretation of Walgreen and Mid-Continent
suggests that the Federal Circuit’s two-step analysis set out in MidContinent did not replace, but merely amended, Commerce’s initial
mixed media test.
Second, pursuant to the scope language “any other processing
that would not otherwise remove the merchandise from the scope of
the order,” the Court conducted a “substantial processing” analysis,
and on that basis concluded that the plain meaning did not include the
merchandise at issue in the Italian and Chinese CORE Orders. 121 That
analysis shared some similarities with Commerce’s substantial
transformation analysis, but as explained above, the substantial
Id. at *11-12.
Id. at *13.
119
Id. at *11 n.3.
120
Walgreen, 620 F.3d at 1356-57.
121
See Trendium, at *11-15.
117
118
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transformation analysis has historically been applied separately from
a review of the text of a scope, and has been used for purposes of
determining the country of origin. 122 The Court’s consideration and
factual conclusions with respect to the processing experience of the
merchandise at issue, to determine if Commerce’s scope ruling was
consistent with the plain meaning of the scope, appears to be
unprecedented and unique. The CIT’s detailed analysis of the
procedures which go into the processing of the product went clearly
beyond the “plain meaning” of the scope, but the CIT used that
analysis external of the text of the scope to then return to the text and
inform its understanding of the “plain meaning” of the text. Such an
analysis differs from previous interpretive tools or analyses
considered and applied by the CIT and Federal Circuit, such as the
usage of certain terms in the trade or previous Commerce
interpretations of the same or similar language in other Orders. 123
E.

Scope Exclusion “Tests” Can Be Difficult to Interpret
and Apply

Finally, it is worth noting that a large amount of scope rulings,
and naturally scope ruling litigation, pertain to scope exclusions. As
one would expect, foreign exporters and importers request that
Commerce find their merchandise, which has been determined
initially at the border by CBP to be subject merchandise, to be nonsubject, excluded merchandise, while petitioners want the opposite –
for Commerce to clarify that certain products are subject to an Order.
Such a determination is much more complicated when the exclusion
language does not explicitly exclude products of definitive sizes and
dimensions, but instead excludes generalized products that meet
certain criteria, akin to an exclusion “test.”
There is no better example than two of the exclusions found in
the Aluminum Extrusions from China Orders:

See id. Commerce never conducted a substantial transformation analysis in the
underlying case, nor did the Court direct Commerce to conduct one on remand.
123
See., e.g., Arcelormittal Stainless Belgium v. United States, 694 F.3d 82, 86-7 (Fed.
Cir. 2012).
122
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The scope also excludes finished merchandise
containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully
and permanently assembled and completed at the time
of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors
with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and
backing material, and solar panels. The scope also
excludes finished goods containing aluminum
extrusions that are entered unassembled in a “finished
goods kit.” A finished goods kit is understood to mean
a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the
time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully
assemble a final finished good and requires no further
finishing or fabrication, such as cutting or punching,
and is assembled “as is” into a finished product. An
imported product will not be considered a “finished
goods kit” and therefore excluded from the scope of
the Orders merely by including fasteners such as
screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an aluminum
extrusion product. 124
These two exclusions, known as the “finished merchandise”
exclusion and the “finished goods kit” exclusion have been at issue in
dozens of scope ruling determinations – very likely the most scope
rulings to date that have ever been issued pursuant to a single scope
by Commerce. Those scope exclusions have also been the source of a
large amount of litigation, such as two separate scope rulings
involving “curtain walls,” 125 scope rulings addressing “trim kits” (an
aesthetic frame around the perimeter of a refrigerator or freezer), 126
124
Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Antidumping Duty
Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650, 30,651 (May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the
People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653, 30,654
(May 26, 2011).
125
See, e.g., Yuanda I, 146 F. Supp. 3d at 1331; Yuanda II, 279 F. Supp. 3d at 1209;
Yuanda III, 918 F.3d at 1355; Yuanda 2015, 776 F.3d at 1351.
126
See, e.g., Meridian Products, LLC v. United States, 971 F. Supp. 2d 1259 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2014), aff’d, Meridian Products, LLC. v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 3d 1342
(Ct. Int’l Trade 2014), reconsidered, 77 F. Supp. 3d 1307 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2015), aff’d,
Meridian Products, LLC. v. United States,145 F. Supp. 3d 1329 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016),
rev’d and Commerce scope ruling affirmed in Meridian V, 918 F. 3d at 1379-1384.
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and scope rulings pertaining to appliance handles. 127 Questions that
Commerce, and at times the courts, have struggled with include, but
certainly are not limited to: When is a product considered “finished?”
What is the relevance of non-aluminum fasteners to finished
merchandise? What makes a product a “fastener?” What does “further
finishing or fabrication” mean when a finished product is incorporated
into a different product? Can a door be considered “finished
merchandise” under the Aluminum Extrusion Orders if it doesn’t have
glass or vinyl, as expressly articulated, but has a screen instead? What
does assembly “as is” into a finished product “at the time of
importation” mean for products that can’t be assembled until after
importation at a date later than the date of entry? Can products
shipped on multiple vessels, but all imported under the same entry
form, be considered excluded under the “finished goods kit”
exclusion?
Because there is a wide variety and large quantity of extruded
aluminum products exported from China to the United States,
Commerce has spent an extensive amount of time and resources
analyzing those products, including the processes by which those
products are manufactured, assembled, sold and exported, to answer
questions such as these under those two exclusion paragraphs. In
addition, Commerce and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) have also
spent a great deal of time and resources defending many of those
determinations in challenges before the CIT and the Federal Circuit.
The courts have ordered Commerce in several cases to issue remand
redeterminations providing even more analysis and requesting the
collection of even more data, resulting in remands which have been at
times sixty pages or more in length.
Needless to say, the Aluminum Extrusions from China Orders
should be seen as a lesson, or perhaps even a “problematic scope
poster child,” to both petitioners and Commerce. Petitioners should be
cautious in proposing, and Commerce should continue to discourage,
See, e.g., Meridian Products, LLC v. United States, 125 F. Supp. 3d 1306 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2015), remand affirmed, 180 F. Supp. 3d 1283 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016), reversed
and remanded, 890 F.3d 1272 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Whirlpool Corp. v. United States, 144
F. Supp. 3d 1296 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2016), remand affirmed, 182 F. Supp. 3d 1307 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2016), affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in
890 F.3d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2018).

127

74

U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV.

V. 28

generalized “tests” in drafting scope exclusions. The inclusion of such
tests in scope exclusions can create a large burden not only on
Commerce, importers and exporters, but also on CBP, DOJ, and the
courts. On a broader point, it is also a great example of how decisions
made at the investigation phase can have lasting and real impacts on
the application and administration of scopes long after the Order has
been finalized and issued.
IV.

IF MERCHANDISE IS FOUND TO CIRCUMVENT AN AD OR CVD
ORDER, IT CAN BE DETERMINED TO BE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
THE ORDER

In addition to defining the scope and scope rulings, Congress
provided a provision in the statute to address products which are
physically outside the scope of an AD or CVD Order, but have been
used by producers, exporters or importers to circumvent the
application of the Order. Under section 19 U.S.C. §1677j, titled
“[p]revention of circumvention of antidumping and countervailing
duty orders,” the statute address four specific scenarios where even
though merchandise falls outside the text of the scope, if Commerce
makes an affirmative circumvention finding, Commerce is permitted
to find that circumventing merchandise is subject to the Order at issue.
The four scenarios are: (a) Merchandise completed or assembled in the
United States; (b) Merchandise completed or assembled in other
foreign countries; (c) Minor alterations of merchandise; and (d) Laterdeveloped merchandise. Below are examples of each of these
circumvention determinations, and a description of how Commerce
sometimes applies its circumvention determinations on a “country
wide” basis to prevent future circumvention of an Order. 128

For three of these circumvention scenarios, Commerce is directed to notify the ITC
“of the proposed inclusion of such merchandise in such countervailing duty or
antidumping order or finding,” and “take into account any advice provided by” the
ITC before making a circumvention determination. 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(e); §§ 1677(a),
(b), (d). See also 19 C.F.R. 351.225(f)(7).
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Merchandise Completed or Assembled in the United
States

The Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, provides that if (a)
“merchandise sold in the United States is of the same class or kind as
any other merchandise that is the subject of” an AD or CVD order; (b)
“such merchandise is completed or assembled in the United states
from parts or components produced in the foreign country with
respect to which such order or finding applies”; (c) “the process of
assembly or completion in the United States is minor or insignificant”;
and (d) “the value of the parts or components referred to in
subparagraph (B) is a significant portion of the total value of the
merchandise,” Commerce “may include within the scope of such order
or finding the imported parts or components referred to in
subparagraph (B) that are used in the completion or assembly of the
merchandise in the United States at any time such order or finding is
in effect.” 129
To determine if a “process is minor or insignificant” the statute
provides that Commerce “shall take into account --- (A) the level of
investment in the United States, (B) the level of research and
development in the United States, (C) the nature of the production
process in the United States, (D) the extent of production facilities in
the United States, and (E) whether the value of the processing
performed in the United States represents a small proportion of the
value of the merchandise sold in the United States.” 130
Furthermore, to determine “whether to include parts or
components” in a CVD or AD order, Commerce is directed to also
“take into account factors such as – (A) the pattern of trade, including
sourcing patterns, (B) whether the manufacturer or exporter of the
parts or components is affiliated with the person who assembles or
Prevention of circumvention of antidumping and countervailing duty orders, 19
U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(1)(A-D)(emphasis added).
130
19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(2). Section 225(g) addresses this analysis, explaining that in
determining if a process is minor or insignificant, no “single factor” will be
“controlling,” and “in determining the value of the parts or components purchased
from affiliated person” or “of processing performed by an affiliated person,”
Commerce may base that value on the “cost of producing the part or component . . .
.” 19 C.F.R 351.225(g).
129
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completes the merchandise sold in the United States from the parts or
components produced in the foreign country with respect to which the
order” applies, and “(C) whether imports into the United States of the
parts or components produced in such foreign country have increased
after the initiation of the investigation which resulted in the issuance”
of the order. 131
An example of merchandise completed or assembled in the
United States was the importation of unfinished Polyethylene Retail
Carrier Bags (“PRCBs”) from Taiwan that resembled the in-scope
merchandise except that they were in a continuous roll such that the
bottoms were open and they lacked handles. 132 Commerce found that
in the United States, nine-inch bags were cut off the roll, one side was
heat-sealed, and handles were cut out. 133 Commerce determined: 1)
that the unfinished PRCBs were of the same “class or kind” as the
subject merchandise; 2) that the merchandise sold in the United States
was completed from parts or components produced in Taiwan; 3) that
the process of assembly or completion in the United States was minor
or insignificant; and 4) that the value of the parts or components
produced in Taiwan was a significant portion of the total value of the
merchandise. 134 With respect to the “additional factors to consider,”
Commerce concluded that the record was inconclusive as to a change
in the pattern of trade, that there was no evidence of affiliation
between the producers or exporters and those assembling the bags in
the United States, and that subsequent import volumes did not detract
from, or support, circumvention findings. 135 Accordingly, Commerce
determined that “imports of unfinished PRCBs from Taiwan are
circumventing the Order.” 136

19 U.S.C. § 1677j(a)(3).
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Taiwan: Affirmative Final Determination
of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 79 Fed. Reg. 61056 (Oct. 9, 2014)
[hereinafter PRCB Final Determination].
133
Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bags from Taiwan: Affirmative Preliminary
Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 79 Fed. Reg. 31302
(June 2, 2014), and accompanying Preliminary Decision Memorandum [hereinafter
PRCB PDM], dated June 2, 2014 (79 ITADOC 31302) (Westlaw).
134
PRCB PDM, supra note 133, at 3-10.
135
Id. at 9-10.
136
PRCB Final Determination, supra note 132, at 61,056.
131
132
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Merchandise Completed or Assembled in Other
Foreign Countries

Under the second circumvention scenario, the statute provides
that if (A) “merchandise imported into the United States is of the same
class or kind as any merchandise produced in a foreign country that is
the subject of” an AD or CVD order; (B) “before importation in to the
United States, such imported merchandise is completed or assembled
in another foreign country from merchandise which (i) is subject to
such (an) order or finding, or (ii) is produced in the foreign country
with respect to which such order or finding applies; (C) “the process
of assembly or completion in the foreign country” is “minor or
insignificant”; (D) “the value of the merchandise produced in the
foreign country to which the antidumping duty order applies is a
significant portion of the total value of the merchandise exported to
the United States”; and (E) Commerce “determines that action is
appropriate under this paragraph to prevent evasion of such (an) order
or finding,” Commerce “may include such imported merchandise
within the scope of such order or finding at any time such order or
finding is in effect.” 137
To determine if a “process is minor or insignificant” the statute
provides that Commerce “shall take into account --- (A) the level of
investment in the foreign country, (B) the level of research and
development in the foreign country, (C) the nature of the production
process in the foreign country, (D) the extent of production facilities in
the foreign country, and (E) whether the value of the processing
performed in the foreign country represents a small proportion of the
value of the merchandise imported into the United States.” 138
Furthermore, to determine “whether to include merchandise
assembled or completed in a foreign country” in a CVD or AD order,
Commerce is directed to “take into account factors such as – (A) the
19 U.S.C. § 1677j(b)(1)(A)-(E) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 1677j(b)(2); accord 19 C.F.R. 351.225(g), (h) (explaining that in
determining if a process is minor or insignificant, no “single factor” will be
“controlling,” and “in determining the value of the parts or components purchased
from an affiliated person,” or “of processing performed by an affiliated person,” or
“of processing performed by an affiliated person”). Commerce may base that value on
the “cost of producing the part or component . . . .” 19 C.F.R 351.225(h).
137
138
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pattern of trade, including sourcing patterns, (B) whether the
manufacturer or exporter of the merchandise” is “affiliated with the
person who uses the merchandise” to “assemble or complete in the
foreign country the merchandise that is subsequently imported into
the United States,” and “(C) whether imports into the foreign country
of the merchandise” have “increased after the initiation of the
investigation which resulted in the issuance” of the Order. 139
An example of this type of circumvention involved Small
Diameter Graphite Electrodes (“SDGE”) from China. 140 At issue was a
company that took Chinese-manufactured artificial/synthetic graphic
forms, exported those forms to the United Kingdom, and in the United
Kingdom those forms were tooled and shaped through additional
machine processing into SDGEs, which were then exported to the
United States. 141 Commerce determined that (1) the SDGE exported to
the United States was identical to that covered by the AD Order
covering SDGE from China; (2) the artificial/synthetic graphic form
inputs were produced in China, the country subject to the SDGE AD
Order; (3) the process of assembly or completion occurring in the
United Kingdom was minor or insignificant in comparison to the
totality of the production of subject merchandise; (4) the value of the
processing done to the merchandise in the United Kingdom
represented a small proportion of the value of the merchandise sold in
the United States, both quantitatively and qualitatively; and (5)
Chinese-produced merchandise represented a significant percentage
of the sales value of the exporter’s United States exports of finished
merchandise. 142 With respect to the “other factors to consider,”
Commerce concluded that Chinese exports of SDGE to the United
States had decreased significantly, while United Kingdom exports of
SDGE to the United States, as well as the exporter’s sourcing of the
relevant inputs from China, had increased – reflecting a pattern of

19 U.S.C. § 1677j(b)(3).
Small Diameter Graphite Electrodes from the People’s Republic of China:
Affirmative Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order,
77 Fed. Reg. 47,596 (Aug. 9, 2012) (final admin. review) [hereinafter Graphite
Electrodes from China].
141
Id. at 47,597.
142
See id. at 47,599.
139
140
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trade that supported a circumvention determination. 143 Furthermore,
Commerce found that although the exporter was not affiliated with
Chinese producers of artificial graphite rod/unfinished SDGE
component inputs, there had been a significant increase in the Chinese
exports of artificial graphite to the United Kingdom. 144 Accordingly,
taking all of the information and factors into consideration, Commerce
determined that the exporter had circumvented the Chinese AD Order
on SDGE.
An interesting legal issue that is unique to circumvention
based on completion or assembly in third countries is the interaction
between such a circumvention analysis and Commerce’s country-oforigin test. For example, in a circumvention inquiry covering certain
CORE from China, Commerce applied the statutory criteria of 19
U.S.C. § 1677(b) and concluded that companies which produced hotrolled steel (HRS) in China or cold-rolled steel (CRS) in China, and
then exported that merchandise to Vietnam, and used those inputs in
the production of CORE in Vietnam, were circumventing the AD and
CVD orders on CORE from China. 145 Exporters argued that because
Commerce had determined in past cases that the country-of-origin
changed as a result of the substantial transformation that occurred
when hot-rolled steel was turned into cold-rolled steel, and that the
country-of-origin changed as a result of the substantial transformation
that occurred when cold-rolled steel was galvanized and turned into
CORE, the resulting CORE constituted Vietnamese merchandise and
thus the CORE could not be covered by the Chinese CORE Order with
19 U.S.C. §1677j(b). 146
Commerce explained that it did not disagree that the CRS
made from the Chinese HRS, and the CORE made from the Chinese
CRS, would be considered Vietnamese in origin under its country-oforigin test, but that “(t)he application of a substantial transformation
analysis by Commerce to a particular scenario does not preclude
Commerce from also applying an analysis pursuant to” 19 U.S.C.
See id. at 47,599-600.
Id. at 47,600.
145
Certain Corrosion-Resistant Steel Products From the People’s Republic of China:
Affirmative Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty and
Countervailing Duty Orders, 83 Fed. Reg. 23,895, 23,896 (May 23, 2018).
146
See id.
143
144
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§1677j(b), “because the two analyses are distinct and have different
purposes.” 147 Citing the Federal Circuit’s analysis in Bell Supply,
Commerce explained that in fact, “circumvention can only occur if the
articles are from a country not covered by the relevant AD or CVD
orders.” 148 Indeed, Commerce explained if that were not the case, the
circumvention provision would be “superfluous,” because if “the
processing … applied in a third country … did not substantially
transform the subject merchandise, then the resulting product would
retain a country-of-origin of the country subject to the order … such
that the merchandise at issue would still be subject to the order at
issue,” and if the finished merchandise was “subject to the order, then
there [would be] no need to engage in an anti-circumvention analysis
under” section 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(b). 149
In Bell Supply, litigation pertaining to the AD Order on Oil
Country Tubular Goods from China, the Federal Circuit held in 2018 that
this interpretation of the law was correct and concluded that “even
where an article is substantially transformed, Commerce can still find
that it is subject to an AD or CVD order after conducting a
circumvention inquiry.” 150 The Court explained that the legislative
history showed that this was Congress’ intent when it implemented
the third country completion or assembly circumvention provision
into the statute:
(L)egislative history indicates that § 1677j can capture
merchandise that is substantially transformed in third
countries, which further implies that § 1677j and the
substantial
transformation
analysis
are
not
coextensive. In the Conference Report accompanying
the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988,
Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988), Congress
explained that § 1677j addresses situations where
147
Issues and Decision Memorandum for Anti-Circumvention Inquiries on the
Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty Orders on Certain Cold-Rolled Steel Flat
Products from the People’s Republic of China, U.S. Dept of Commerce, International
Trade Administration 14 (May 26, 2018) [hereinafter CORE IDM].
148
Id. at 16 (citing Bell Supply, 888 F.3d at 1229 (emphasis added)).
149
See id. at 16.
150
Bell Supply, 888 F.3d at 1231.
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“parts and components ... are sent from the country
subject to the order to the third country for assembly
or completion.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 600 (1988).
Likewise, the Statement of Administrative Action
Accompanying the Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), describes
how foreign exporters will attempt to “circumvent an
antidumping duty order by ... [p]urchasing as many
parts as possible from a third country” and assembling
them in the United States. H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 893
(1994). Assembling off-the-shelf electronic components
may very well create a new product that is “from the
U.S.” or a third country, but such assembly could still
be relatively minor and undertaken with the intention
of evading AD or CVD orders. We believe that § 1677j
is meant to address these attempts at circumvention,
not preclude Commerce from making a country of
origin determination in the first instance. 151
Commerce articulated the differences of these two provisions
of AD and CVD law succinctly in the CORE from China Circumvention
Final Determination. 152 This description summarizes the purpose of
the country of origin test, as well as the purpose of the third country
completed or assembled provision:
As explained above, substantial transformation is
focused on whether the input product loses its identity
and is transformed into a new product having a new
name, character and use, and thus a new country-oforigin. In contrast, section 781(b) of the Act focuses on
the extent of processing applied to subject
merchandise in a third country and whether such
processing is minor or insignificant such that
performing this processing in a third country can
reasonably be moved across borders, thereby allowing
parties to change the country of origin and avoid the
151
152

Id.
See CORE IDM, supra note 147, at 17-18.
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discipline of an order. There is nothing inherently
contradictory in finding an input substrate to be
substantially transformed into a finished product, in
terms of its physical characteristics and uses, while also
finding the process of effecting that transformation to
be minor vis-à-vis the manufacturing process, as a
whole, for producing the finished product. 153
C.

Minor Alterations of Merchandise

This means of circumvention is described in the statute as
occurring when the “class or kind of merchandise subject to” an
investigation, AD Order, or CVD Order has been “altered in form or
appearance in minor respects (including raw agricultural products
that have undergone minor processing), whether or not included in
the same tariff classification.” 154 The Federal Circuit has held that the
“purpose of minor alteration anti-circumvention inquiries is to
determine whether articles not expressly within the literal scope of a
duty order may nonetheless be found within its scope as a result of a
minor alternation to merchandise covered in the investigation.” 155
In the legislative history of this provision, five factors were
listed that Commerce should consider as part of its analysis: (1) the
overall physical characteristics of the merchandise; (2) the expectations
of the ultimate users; (3) the use of the merchandise; (4) the channels
of marketing of the merchandise; and (5) the cost of any modification
relative to the total value of the imported products. 156 It is Commerce’s
practice to consider those factors in applying the “minor alterations”
circumvention provision. 157

153

Id.
19 U.S.C. § 1677j(c)(1); see also 19 C.F.R 351.225(i) (mirroring the same statutory
language).
155
Deacero S.A. DE C.V. v. United States, 817 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
156
Omnibus Trade Act of 1987, S. Fin. Rep. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1987).
157
The Federal Circuit has held that even if “some quantity” of a product “may have
been in existence at some time in non-investigated countries,” this fact does “not limit”
Commerce’s ability to find in a circumvention inquiry that a minor alteration has
occurred to products which were not “produced in investigated countries at the time
the petition was filed” in circumvention of an Order. See Deacero, 817 F.3d at 1339.
154
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As an example, in a circumvention case pertaining to Steel
Threaded Rod from China, the scope provided a description of the
percent of various elements composing the steel thread, stating that
subject merchandise would not be composed of more than, for
example, 1.50 percent of silicon, 1.00 percent of copper, or 1.25 percent
of chromium by weight. 158 One producer/exporter was found to be
exporting steel threaded rod from China containing between 1.25
percent and 1.45 percent chromium by weight. 159 Upon analysis,
Commerce made the following conclusions: (1) The only differences
physically between the subject merchandise previously exported by
the reviewed company and the steel threaded rod at issue was slightly
higher amounts of chromium, carbon and manganese, and a slightly
higher tensile strength. There was no evidence, however, that the
company’s customers had ever requested the change in chemical
makeup or that the very slight change in tensile strength was ever a
specification taken into consideration when making the change. (2)
The purchasers of the steel threaded rod at issue did not expect the
product to perform differently from subject merchandise. (3) The
merchandise at issue was used in and for the same manner as the
subject merchandise. (4) The channels and sales of distribution
between the merchandise at issue and subject merchandise were
identical. And (5) the costs of modification to the production of the
steel threaded rod to increase chromium content were minimal in
comparison to the overall cost of the merchandise. 160 Commerce also
found that the timing of entries supported a finding of circumvention
as sales of the steel threaded rod with additional chromium to the
United States started less than a year after the Steel Threaded Rod from
China Order was issued. 161 Furthermore, Commerce concluded
communications on the record between the importer and the exporter
demonstrated that the steel threaded rod at issue “was intended to
See Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative
Final Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 78 Fed. Reg.
12,718, 12,718-19 (Feb. 25, 2013).
159
See Certain Steel Threaded Rod from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative
Preliminary Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed.
Reg. 71,775 (Dec. 4, 2012), and accompanying PDM, dated December 4, 2012 (77
ITADOC 71776) (Westlaw), at 8 [hereinafter STR PDM].
160
STR PDM, supra note 159, at 7-9.
161
See id. at 9.
158
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circumvent the Order.” 162 Thus, Commerce determined that the
“circumstances under which the” steel threaded rod at issue “entered
the United States provided substantial evidence of circumvention of
the Order.” 163
D.

Later-Developed Merchandise

The fourth, and final, means of circumvention addressed in the
statute applies when merchandise is “developed after an investigation
is initiated.” In determining if the later-developed merchandise should
be considered “within the scope” of outstanding AD and CVD Orders,
Commerce is directed to consider whether (A) “the later-developed
merchandise has the same general physical characteristics as the
merchandise with respect to which the order was originally issue[d] .
. . ;” (B) “the expectations of the ultimate purchasers of the laterdeveloped merchandise are the same as for [the] earlier product;” (C)
“the ultimate use of the earlier product and the later-developed
merchandise are the same;” (D) “the later-developed merchandise is
sold through the same channels of trade as the earlier product,” and
(E) “the later-developed merchandise is advertised and displayed in a
manner similar to the earlier product.” 164 However, unlike the other
circumvention scenarios, the statute states Commerce “may not
exclude a later-developed merchandise from” an AD or CVD Order
“merely because the merchandise (A) is classified under a tariff
classification other than that identified in the petition” or Commerce’s
“prior notices during the proceeding,” or (B) “permits the purchaser
to perform additional functions, unless such additional functions
constitute the primary use of the merchandise and the cost of
additional functions constitute more than a significant proportion of
the total cost of production of the merchandise.” 165
The legislative history of this provision suggests that Congress
believed that later-developed products can be ones which have been
162

Id.
Id.
164
Prevention of Circumvention of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 19
U.S.C. § 1677j(d)(1)(A-E); see 19 C.F.R 351.225(j) (applying to this provision but
just referring back to the statutory language).
165
19 U.S.C. § 1677j(d)(2)(A)-(B).
163
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produced as a result of a “significant technological advancement or a
significant alteration of the merchandise involving commercially
significant changes.” 166 In general, if it was “commercially available”
at the time an Order was issued, Commerce will not find a product to
be later-developed. However, if the product at issue was not
commercially available, but merely existed, at the time the Order was
issued, one might still consider that product to be later-developed.
Commerce’s analysis in this regard has been affirmed by the CIT and
Federal Circuit as in accordance with law. 167 Thus, it is Commerce’s
practice to consider if the product was commercially available at the
time the Order was issued when applying the later-developed
circumvention provision. Furthermore, Commerce also examines
whether the merchandise is “materially different” from merchandise
that was under consideration at the time of the investigation. 168
For example, in a circumvention determination pertaining to
the AD Order covering Honey from China, Commerce concluded that
blends of honey and rice syrup, regardless of the percentage of honey
that they contained, were later-developed merchandise. 169 First,
Commerce determined that the evidence on the record indicated that
“blends of honey and rice syrup were not commercially available at
the time of the investigation.” 170 Indeed, evidence on the record
showed “that the first imports of blends of honey and rice syrup to the
United States from” China “did not occur until August 2004,” three
years after the AD Order covering Honey from China was issued. 171
See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 603 (1988), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.A.N. 1547, 1636 (stating that “a later-developed product
incorporating a new technology that provides additional capability, speed, or functions
would be covered by the order as long as it has the same basic characteristics and
uses”).
167
See Target Corp. v. United States, 578 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1375-76 (Ct. Int’l Trade
2008), aff’d Target II, 609 F.3d at 1360.
168
See Honey from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative Preliminary
Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg.
37,378, 37,379-80 (June 21, 2012) [hereinafter Preliminary Honey Determination].
169
See Honey from the People’s Republic of China: Affirmative Final Determination
of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty Order, 77 Fed. Reg. 50,464, 50,464 (Aug.
21, 2012).
170
Preliminary Honey Determination, supra note 168, at 37,380.
171
Id.
166
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Next, Commerce determined that while honey blends were
contemplated by the AD Order, “blends of honey and rice syrup are
materially different from those blends because they are not made of C4 sugars. This difference is important because the percentages present
in the Order are premised on honey-sugar blends for which the
percentage of honey and sugar are determinate.” 172
Commerce then turned to the factors listed in the statute and
after conducting an extensive analysis of each factor, came to the
following conclusions: (1) “honey and rice syrup blends, regardless of
the percentage of honey they contain, have the same physical
characteristics as honey;” (2) “consumers have similar expectations for
blends of honey and rice syrup regardless of the percentage of honey
they contain, as well as for pure honey;” (3) “blends of honey and rice
syrup have the same ultimate uses as honey;” (4) “the channels of trade
for all ratios of blends of honey and rice syrup are … similar to those
used for honey;” and (5) “honey and rice syrup blends are advertised
in the same or similar manner as honey.” 173 Thus, in accordance with
its analysis under 19 U.S.C. § 1677j(d) and its analysis of all of these
factors on the administrative record, Commerce determined “that
blends of honey and rice syrup, regardless of the percentage of honey
they contain,” had circumvented the AD Order and should be treated
as in-scope merchandise. 174
E.

Country-Wide Application

Neither the statute, nor the regulations, direct Commerce on
how to implement an affirmative circumvention determination other
than to state that Commerce will include “such merchandise” in a CVD
or AD Order. 175 As evasion concerns are the fundamental purpose of
circumvention inquiries, 176 Commerce has in recent years determined
Id. at 37,381.
Id. at 37,381-83.
174
Id. at 37,383.
175
19 U.S.C. § 1677j(e).
176
The legislative history of the circumvention provisions makes this clear, as it states
that the purpose of the circumvention statute “is to authorize [Commerce] to apply
[AD and CVD] orders in such as a way as to prevent circumvention and diversion of
U.S. law.” Omnibus Trade Act, Report of the Senate Finance Committee, S. Rep. No.
71, 100th Cong., 1st sess. 100 (1987). It also states that Congress was concerned with
172
173
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in some cases to apply the results of its circumvention determinations
“country-wide” -- addressing not only the actual models of products
and specific exporters found to be circumventing an AD or CVD
Order, but also other exporters and comparable products that might
be able to essentially circumvent a circumvention determination. For
example, imagine if Company A circumvented an AD Order on 2 inch,
3 inch, 4 inch, and 5 inch widgets, by exporting a 1.9-inch widget to the
United States, and then adding on .1 inches of rubber covering in the
United States, thereby circumventing the very specifically-described 2
inch product covered by the order. If Commerce only applied the
circumvention determination to Company A, and then only to the 1.9
inch widgets it exported, nothing would stop Company A from later
doing the same or similar activities to avoid the order on 3, 4, or 5 inch
widgets. Likewise, if it was only applied to Company A, nothing
would stop Companies B, C, and D from exporting 1.9-inch widgets
and adding .1 inch of rubber themselves in the United States in
circumvention of the Order. Accordingly, it is logical in certain
circumstances for Commerce to issue a circumvention determination
that covers all exporters of not only a certain type of merchandise, but
also comparable merchandise that could otherwise benefit from the
same type of circumvention.
In a recent, real-world experience, Commerce applied its
circumvention determination “country-wide” in proceedings covering
the Aluminum Extrusions from China AD and CVD Orders. 177 A Chinese
company, which had been previously found to be circumventing those
Orders in a different case involving similar merchandise completed or
assembled in the United States, entered into a scheme where it spent
the time and money to fabricate aluminum extrusion products from
the existence of “loopholes” because such scenarios “seriously undermine the
effectiveness of the remedies provided by the [AD and CVD] proceedings, and
frustrated the purposes for which these laws were enacted.” Id. Further, Congress
indicated it anticipated that Commerce would implement and administer the
circumvention laws aggressively so that it could “foreclose” those “practices.” Id.
177
Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China: Final Affirmative
Determination of Circumvention of the Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty
Orders, and Partial Rescission, 84 Fed. Reg. 39,805, 39,805-06 (Aug. 12, 2019)
[hereinafter Final Aluminum Circumvention Determination], and accompanying
Issues and Decision Memorandum, dated July 31, 2019 [hereinafter Aluminum
Circumvention IDM].
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their raw inputs in China. The company then exported those products
to its affiliate in Vietnam, remelted the aluminum extrusion products
into other aluminum extrusion products, and either exported the
merchandise to the United States, declaring the merchandise as
Vietnamese in origin, or sold the merchandise in billet form to
unaffiliated Vietnamese producers, who then fabricated extruded
products from the billets and did the same. 178 Commerce found that
this company was not only one of the largest extruders of aluminum
in the world, but that it accounted for the largest volume of aluminum
extrusions exported from China to Vietnam, that Vietnamese imports
of Chinese aluminum extrusions increased during the period of time
subject to review, and that the level of investment and research in
Vietnam was minor compared to the investment in China for the initial
extruded aluminum. 179 It should come as no surprise that Commerce
determined that this company had circumvented the AD and CVD
Orders covering Aluminum Extrusions from China through the process
of assembly or completion in Vietnam. 180
In light of the facts and scheme before it, Commerce
determined that the application of a country-wide application of this
circumvention determination was appropriate, concluding that “all
extruded aluminum from Vietnam produced from aluminum
previously extruded in China (including billets created from re-melted
Chinese extrusions)” were covered by the AD and CVD Orders
covering Aluminum Extrusions from China. 181 To enforce such a
determination, Commerce published certification requirements for

Aluminum Circumvention IDM, supra note 177, at 7-8, 11. Commerce in fact had
issued three affirmative circumvention determinations involving this particular
company in the past. See id. at n. 21. Interestingly, the former chairman and president
of this company was indicted in July 2019 by a federal grand jury of smuggling large
quantities of aluminum into the United States to evade the payment of $1.8 million in
AD and CVD duties. See Chinese billionaire indicted on charges of skirting U.S.
POST
(July
31,
2019,
5:04
PM),
aluminum
tariffs,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/chinese-billionaire-indicted-oncharges-of-skirting-us-aluminum-tariffs/2019/07/31/7930c572-b3ca-11e9-89495f36ff92706e_story.html.
179
Aluminum Circumvention IDM, supra note 177, at 9.
180
Final Aluminum Circumvention Determination, supra note 177, at 39,806.
181
Id.
178
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importers and exporters of aluminum extrusions from Vietnam. 182 All
importers and exporters of aluminum extrusions from Vietnam on or
after March 5, 2018, are now required to complete and maintain a
certification that certifies that the exported extrusions were not
produced from Chinese aluminum extrusions, including billets
created from re-melted Chinese extrusions. 183 In this manner,
Commerce looked beyond the specific circumventing company and
products and realized that the nature of the circumvention was such
that a country-wide application was necessary to effectively address
the evasion concerns brought to light in this circumvention inquiry.
V.

CONCLUSION

There are numerous legal and policy issues which pertain to
the scope of Commerce’s AD and CVD Orders. Whether it is the
defining of the scope of an Order in an investigation, the issuance of a
scope ruling following a detailed scope inquiry, or the publishing of a
circumvention determination in the Federal Register, the laws and
policies pertaining to the scopes of AD and CVD Orders are interesting
and somewhat complicated. Accordingly, it is this author’s hope that
this paper has provided some insight on how these scope-related laws
and procedures operate. All of the United States’ AD and CVD laws
should be properly and effectively administered, and as explained
above, there is nothing more fundamental to the administration and
enforcement of those laws than a clear, well-written and well-thoughtout scope. Of the numerous “scoops” on Commerce’s scopes described
in this paper, that is the most important “scoop” of them all.

182
183

Id. at 39,806-08.
Id.

